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forming the basis of the analysis while secondary data is used to gain an 
understanding of events in the deregulation process. The future studies 
approach introduced the use of the scenario methodology as a way to explore 
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Conclusions 
 
The research presents the following three scenarios outlining how competition 
may play out in the market: 
1. No challenger enters the market and VR will continue to operate as the 
sole provider of passenger rail services. 
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3. The challenger competes against VR using some sort of route network. 
A) The challenger operates a hybrid network of train and bus services 
B) The challenger wins the tendering of commuter services in the 
Helsinki region.        
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Research Background 
 
In 2017 the Finnish government announced its intentions to open the passenger rail 
market to competition (LVM, 2017). Shortly after it was also announced that the 
agreement between state-owned railway undertaking VR (Valtion Rautatiet Yhtymä 
OY) and the Ministry of Transport and Communications (LVM) will not be renewed at 
maturity in 2024 (LVM, 2017). These decisions mark the beginning of a new era in 
Finnish railway history and the end of VR’s long-standing de jure monopoly as the sole 
provider of passenger rail services. The current expectation is that there will be open 
access to the long-distance passenger market from 2025 onwards.  
 
Passenger rail traffic in Finland is often divided into two forms; commuter traffic within 
the Helsinki region and long-distance traffic; which is the focus of this research. The 
decision to open the passenger rail market to competition applies to all passenger 
traffic, however the deregulation process for each form will be separate and follow 
different schedules. For example, commuter traffic in the Helsinki region will be 
tendered and the bidding process is currently underway with the winning bidder set to 
begin operations already in 2021 (HSL, 2019). Meanwhile, long-distance passenger 
services will follow the open access approach (LVM, 2019a).  
 
While the Finnish government believes that deregulation can improve social wellbeing 
and reduce the burden on taxpayers, legislative pressure has been the primary 
catalyst for the decision to finally open the passenger market. Beginning in 2001, the 
European Commission has ratified legislation in the form of four successive railway 
packages which aim to gradually open national rail markets in EU member countries 
to competition (European Commission, 2020). In order to comply with EU legislation, 
a new Rail Transport Act (1302/2018) was signed into effect in 2019 which enforces a 
level playing field in the rail sector (LVM, 2018). Particularly in recent years the 
pressure to comply with EC legislation has been building as the final railway package 
passed in 2016 originally proposed for national EU rail markets to already have been 
open by December 2019 (European Commission, 2020). At the moment, Finland does 
not comply with this exhortation due to the existing contract between VR and the 
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Ministry of Transport and Communications which prevents the market from being 
opened.  
 
The economic rationale for deregulating industries focuses on the potential efficiency 
gains that could arise as a result of reducing government control and allowing free 
market ideologies and competition to flourish. Supporters of deregulation argue that 
regulated markets exhibit numerous “market rigidities’” that hinder the working of these 
markets. These unnecessary rigidities contribute to increasing costs and thus, they 
are considered to lower efficiency. Thus, deregulation has often been the solution to 
these concerns (Pera, 1989). 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Timeline of Railway Deregulation in Finland. Source: Author 
 
 
The original deregulation plan was published shortly after the announcement of the 
government’s intention to open the passenger rail market in 2017. The plan (referred 
to as Berner’s Railway Deregulation Initiative) was presented by the Minister of 
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Transport and Communication, Anne Berner and proposed that the market would be 
restructured while, competition would be introduced to the market in the form of 
competitive tendering for long-distance routes. The market restructuring meant that 
VR would be split into three state-owned entities; a rolling stock company, a 
maintenance company and real-estate company (LVM, 2017). In this arrangement the 
winner(s) of the tendering process would then purchase maintenance services and 
lease rolling stock and real-estate from the newly formed state-owned entities (LVM, 
2017). This approach aims to overcome the perceived barrier to entry posed by the 
non-standard rail gauge and thus attempts to increase the attractiveness of the market 
to competitors.  
 
Unexpectedly, in 2019 the Ministry of Transport and Communications announced that 
the planning of Berner’s Railway Deregulation Initiative was abandoned. Instead, 
competition to the long-distance passenger rail market would be introduced following 
the open access model and VR would not be split (LVM, 2019a). Essentially the open 
access model is the polar opposite of Berner’s Railway Deregulation Initiative as each 
railway undertaking competes using its own rolling stock while being responsible for 
arranging supporting services including maintenance (LVM, 2019a). Thus, significant 
investment is required from a new railway undertaking planning to enter the market. 
Figure 1. shows a timeline of the railway deregulation process in Finland. 
 
 
1.1.1 The Finnish Passenger Rail Market 
 
Measured by market share, rail is the third most popular mode of transport in Finland. 
Meanwhile private car accounts for an overwhelmingly large number of journeys. 
(Figure 2.)  
 
The passenger rail market can be divided into two distinct categories: commuter traffic 
in the Helsinki region and long-distance traffic. In 2019, about 16.2% of total annual 
journeys were long-distance revealing that majority of passenger rail travel occurs 
within the capital region (Finnish Transport Infrastructure Agency, 2019). Traffic flows 
in the long-distance passenger market can be described as Helsinki-centric. While 
services are operated throughout the country, long-distance passenger traffic is 
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heavily concentrated on five major routes: Helsinki – Kouvola, Helsinki – Oulu, Helsinki 
- Seinäjoki Helsinki - Tampere and Helsinki - Turku. Beyond these routes traffic flows 
are typically small meaning market-driven demand is minimal (refer to Appendix 2). 
 
 
Figure 2. Public Transport Market Share in Finland, 2017 (Traficom, 2017) 
 
 
Rail services in the long-distance passenger market can be split into three types: 
market-driven rail service, purchased rail service and publically obligated rail service 
(PSO) (LVM, 2019b). Market-driven rail services tend to exist on the aforementioned 
routes connecting major cities. Purchased rail services refer to otherwise lossmaking 
rail services that the Ministry of Transport and Communications pays VR to operate. 
Publically obligated rail services refer to unprofitable rail services that guarantee social 
mobility in rural areas. VR must operate these services as a part of its arrangement 
with the Ministry of Transport and Communications in exchange for its monopoly 
position (LVM, 2019b). The annual revenue of total passenger rail traffic was 441.2 
million EUR in 2019 (VR Group, 2019a). In the same year, purchased rail services 
brought an additional revenue stream of 30 million EUR while, public service 
obligations cost the company roughly 21 million EUR (LVM, 2019b and 
Valtioneuvosto, 2019).  
 
Figure 3. show the total number of annual long-distance passenger rail journeys during 
the past 30 years. A general period of stable increase can be observed from 1990 to 
the early 2010s, followed by a drastic decrease over the course of the next 5 years. 
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Figure 3. Total Annual Long-Distance Rail Journeys, 1990-2019  
(Finnish Transport Infrastructure Agency, 2020) 
 
This decrease can be attributed to VR’s floundering public image due to high ticket 
prices and poor punctuality which resulted in people avoiding rail travel. Moreover, 
began to VR face intense competition from long-distance bus company Onnibus.com 
which effectively implemented a low pricing strategy. However, the explosive growth 
in the number of annual long-distance passenger rail journeys during the past five 
years has reversed the declining trend. During this time the number of passenger 
journeys has increased by nearly 25% (VR Group, 2020). Growth in the market has 
been driven by the increasing demand for sustainable transport among the the Finnish 
population and substantial reductions in ticket prices.  
 
 
1.1.2 Railway Deregulation in Europe 
 
The deregulation of railways has been common in Europe as most countries have 
gradually opened their national markets to competition. A more in-depth discussion 
outlining the need to pursue various degrees of deregulation in the rail sector is 
provided in the literature review. In summary, public financial support for rail sectors 
throughout Europe began to increase as railways lost market share to other means of 
transport in the 1970s. In addition, state-owned monopolies, often characterized by 
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poor performance and inefficiency, were responsible for the rail sector in most 
countries (Jensen, 1998). Thus, deregulating the rail sector was seen as a way to 
revitalize railways in Europe (Walters, 2007).  
  
Sweden was the first European country to begin the process of deregulating its rail 
sector in 1988, followed by Britain in 1993. (Alexanderson and Hulten 2008, Lundberg, 
1996 and Preston 2017)). Since then, nearly all European countries have followed 
suit. The deregulation process in most European countries has followed a similar 
pattern consisting of three phases. The first phase involves the vertical separation of 
railway operations and infrastructure. Next, the second phase involves the opening of 
the freight rail market to competition. Finally, the third phase involves the opening of 
the passenger rail market to competition. Finland has also followed this process; 
vertical separation occurred in 1995 and the freight market was opened to competition 
in 2007 (Hilmola and Leino, 2006 and Mäkitalo, 2011). However, Finland remains one 
of the last European countries yet to open its passenger market to competition.  
 
The rail sector is surprisingly efficient despite VR’s de jure monopoly on passenger 
services and this partially explains why policy-makers have been in no hurry to open 
the passenger rail market. Interestingly, the efficiency and overall performance of the 
rail sector in Finland is currently among the highest in Europe. For example, Finland 
is ranked 3rd in BGC’s European Railway Performance Index 2017, ahead of countries 
such as Germany, Britain, and Sweden (refer to Figure 4.) (Duranton et al. 2017).  
 
Similarly, the European Commission ranks rail efficiency in Finland as 8th best in the 
world ahead of Germany (9th), Britain (22nd) and Sweden (30th) (European 
Commission, 2019). However, these rankings should be interpreted cautiously since 
there are inconsistencies in the underlying data and parameters which makes 
comparison between countries difficult and often unreliable. Nevertheless, the 
rankings provide some indication that improving the efficiency of the Finnish rail sector 
is perhaps not the driving force behind the decision to open the passenger market.  
Instead the stated aim of deregulation is to grow the market share of rail in order to 
improve economic and social welfare (LVM, 2017). 
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Figure 4. European Railway Performance Index 2017 (Duranton et al, 2017) 
 
The government believes that competition in the market will lower prices and improve 
service levels. This in turn increases the competitiveness of rail travel in relation to 
substitute means of transport. In particular, a widespread shift away from the use of 
private car would help Finland’s achieve it emissions targets. In addition, economic 
benefits would arise from a decrease in unemployment due to strengthened labor 
mobility throughout the country.  
 
 
 
1.2  Research Problem 
 
VR’s monopoly position has seldom been under threat despite decades of speculation 
regarding the possibility of opening the market. Recently, however, as a consequence 
of legislation passed by the European Commission the outcome of an open long-
distance passenger rail market in Finland has become inevitable. Various challenging 
characteristics make research regarding these upcoming changes particularly 
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intriguing. In Finland, both the population and the market share of the long-distance 
passenger rail market is small. Additionally, the rail system features a non-standard 
gauge, meaning dedicated rolling stock compatible with the infrastructure is required. 
Hence, the problem of the high barrier to entry must be solved in order for the rail 
market to attract and develop competition.  
 
The impact of the competition that may result once these issues are addressed 
presents another point of interest. Finland is one of the last European countries to 
begin the process of opening its passenger rail market to competition. While the 
deregulation of railway markets is hardly a new phenomenon, numerous precedent 
cases throughout Europe reveal uncertainty over the magnitude of the resulting 
beneficial impacts. As a result, Finland should advance reform in its long-distance 
passenger rail market cautiously and simultaneously uphold a critical view of the 
process. 
 
Two problems highlight why researching this topic is important. Firstly, there is of 
course no prior experience with an open passenger rail market in Finland that could 
be investigated. This means there is valuable knowledge to be gained by using 
information that is known today to consider what scenarios could possibly occur in the 
market with regards to competition. Secondly, prior publicly available research into the 
process and impact of opening the Finnish passenger rail market is relatively limited. 
One reason for this is that the relevancy of the issue has, for decades, been diminished 
by longstanding contracts between VR and the government which allows VR to remain 
the exclusive provider of passenger rail services. Even up until the past year, 
information asymmetry combined with the changing situation has made it difficult to 
conduct realistic analysis as an “outsider”. For example, the sudden ministry 
announcement to proceed with the open access competition model in late June of 
2019 means that most prior research is at least partially outdated. Consequently, little 
research and analysis has been conducted which reflects the most recent available 
information regarding the current direction of the deregulation process.  
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1.3  Research Questions and Objectives 
  
The purpose of my research is to evaluate both the process and impact of opening 
long-distance passenger rail services to competition in Finland. Exploration of the 
process gives insight into how changes caused by deregulation will be (or have been) 
implemented. Furthermore, market conditions, structure and barriers to entry factor 
into the choice of the competition model. Ultimately, these variables directly affect the 
ability of the passenger rail market to attract competition and the subsequent changes 
resulting from presence of new railway undertakings.   
 
The following research questions helped guide my research.  
1. What is the best way to introduce competition to the Finnish long-distance 
passenger railway market? 
2. What are the barriers to entry and does the existing rail market offer a level 
playing field for new entrants? 
3. What is the impact of various scenarios of competition? 
4. Is the proposed open access model of deregulation likely to be effective? 
5. What potential shortcomings in the actions and/or proposals of decision 
makers can the research process reveal? 
 
The objective of the research is to provide answers to these questions by combining 
the opinions of industry experts with existing public information to create meaningful 
analysis regarding both the current and future state of the long-distance passenger 
rail market in Finland. Furthermore, the lack of empirical experience can be partially 
overcome by drawing well-reasoned parallels to the impacts of deregulation observed 
in the rail markets of other European countries. Ultimately, the research aims to 
present various competition scenarios, which attempt to describe what the market will 
look like following the introduction of competition and how it will affect various 
stakeholders. 
 
A secondary objective of the research is to offer a critical and reflective perspective on 
the deregulation process from the perspective of an “outsider”. For example, the 
research process may reveal shortcomings in the actions and/or proposals of decision-
makers. By highlighting these potential issues prior to their implementation, decision-
Mäkinen 
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makers are able to make alterations which avoid or minimize any adverse 
consequences. Moreover, analyzing possible impacts of change allows for a better 
understanding of the expected outcomes and in doing so contributes to the general 
thought surrounding the topic.  
 
1.4  Definitions 
 
Barrier to Entry – A barrier to entry is considered anything that prevents or deters 
competition from occurring in the market 
 
Challenger – A railway undertaking that enters the market and competes against the 
incumbent.  
 
Competitive tendering – A competition model where railway undertakings bid for the 
right to operate passenger services solely on predetermined routes. 
 
Deregulation – The removal or relaxation of government regulation over activities in 
a particular industry with the aim of increasing competition.  
 
Incumbent – Typically a state-owned railway undertaking that is strongly positioned 
in the market due to its former monopoly position. 
Infrastructure Manager -  The organization or agency responsible for managing and 
maintaining all aspects of railway infrastructure  
Monopoly – Refers to a situation where a firm is the sole provider of products/service 
in a particular market.  A de jure monopoly and natural monopoly are two types of 
monopoly.  
De jure Monopoly - Refers to a situation where a firm is legally allowed to operate as 
a monopoly by the government 
 
Natural Monopoly – Refers to a situation where a firm operates a monopoly simply 
because factors such as barriers to entry prevents other entrants from entering the 
market 
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Open Access – A competition model, where railway undertakings are free to operate 
passenger services anywhere along the rail network.  
Railway undertaking - A licensed public or private transport operator which provides 
services for the transport of goods and/or passengers by rail.  
Rolling Stock - Locomotives, passenger carriages, wagons, or other vehicles used 
on a railway 
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1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The purpose of this literature review is to gain a theoretical understanding of the central 
ideas, debates and trends in rail economics while simultaneously offering points of 
comparison between the deregulation process of passenger rail services in Finland 
and other European countries. In doing so, the literature review benefits my research 
because it anchors my analysis in some practical realm of precedent.  
 
The literature examined in this literature review is limited to studies which focus on 
investigating railway deregulation in the European context. Although rail deregulation 
has been a global phenomenon with numerous interesting international cases, the 
specific characteristics of the rail systems and markets in the countries that have been 
researched typically differ from those found in Europe and hence the applicability of 
the lessons learned suffers. For example, there is very little passenger traffic in the 
United States as the rail market consists predominantly of freight transport operations. 
In addition, the rail system is distributed over an enormous geographic area. 
Meanwhile, in Japan rail travel is strongly engrained into the way of life which is 
reflected in the high market share of rail travel in overall passenger traffic. 
 
I feel this decision is justified because the empirical research, data and analysis drawn 
from other European countries has a greater relevance for my own research regarding 
railway deregulation in Finland. Also, there may exist additional points of convergence 
due to the overarching legislative conditions posed by the European Commission’s 
railway packages which guide deregulation in European countries. Hence, relevant 
aspects of this information can be cautiously applied to the Finnish case with greater 
reliability. Due to the speculative and future-oriented nature of research it is imperative 
to draw upon relevant examples in order to ensure that the analysis and subsequent 
conclusions are plausible.  
 
Another important aspect which has guided the choice of literature stems from the 
observation that rail sectors in European countries are undergoing deregulatory reform 
at different speeds and stages.  Consequently, it is crucial to include research from a 
considerable time span to better understand the development and impact of these 
reforms. In order to recognize possible changing trends in academic thought, the 
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selection of literature includes research and analysis from the beginning of 
deregulatory rail reform in the early 90s to the present day. 
 
 2.1 Why Deregulate the Rail Sector? 
 
The general consensus among researchers and policymakers, particularly in Europe 
is that the deregulation of network industries is desirable because it lessens the role 
of the state in running these industries. Network industries, which typically describe 
industries such as railways and utilities are defined by Bernstein (2007) as industries 
which “require the utilization of a network or infrastructure capital to deliver their 
services”. This belief has its foundation in classical economic theory, which generally 
predicts that introducing competition into a sector previously run as a state-owned 
monopoly will result in lower costs and better service quality and thus improved overall 
efficiency (Baulol et al. 1982). The underlying assumption is that due to the absence 
of competition, the state-owned monopolist lacks the incentive to improve its 
operations and efficiency. The influence of this thinking is also reflected by the current 
legislative and economic environment within the European Union with the European 
Commission imposing deregulation of the railway sector through formal legislation 
onto member countries.  
 
2.1.1 Poor Performance of State-Owned Monopolies  
 
There have been two primary reasons for why countries in Europe have been under 
pressure to pursue deregulation of their railways over the past 30 years to varying 
degrees. Firstly, a shared trend during the 1970s and 1980s in nearly all European 
countries was a decline of the rail sector’s competitiveness. The rail market was losing 
market share to substitute means of travel and government subsidies were increasing 
(Jensen, 1998). There concerns were reflected in the objectives of rail deregulation of 
pioneering countries. For example, in Sweden these objectives included improving 
“efficiency, customer orientation and profitability”. (Alexandersson and Hulten, 2008 
and Lundberg, 1996).  
 
A shared characteristic throughout Europe during this time was that both railway 
infrastructure and operations were under the ownership of state-owned monopolies. 
Since these firms were protected from competition by the government, they were 
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widely deemed inefficient and the reason for the declining performance of the sector 
(Jensen, 1998). However, despite poor performance, operations in the rail sector were 
and still are regarded as vital to the socioeconomic interests of a country meaning 
there is an incentive to maintain and revitalize them (Walters, 2007).  
 
2.1.2 Political and Legislative Pressure 
 
The second reason for pursuing deregulation has been pressure from the European 
Union’s European Commission to increase competition and encourage eventual open 
markets in transport industries throughout Europe by imposing legislative packages 
(Alexandersson and Hulten, 2008). The initial legislation to pursue this in the railway 
sector was passed in 2001 with the European Commission’s 1st railway package. 
Subsequently the European Commission has released 3 additional legislative 
packages over the span of 15 years with the 4th and final package requiring that every 
EU country should have an open and equal passenger and freight market that can be 
entered by any interested company during the 2020s. (European Commission, 2013).  
 
2.2 Deregulation and Restructuring the Rail Sector 
 
The rail systems in European countries had to be restructured in conjunction with 
deregulation. Seabright et al. (2003) outline two essential aspects of this restructuring; 
vertical integration and horizontal disintegration. The concept of vertical integration is 
concerned with the distinction between ownership and the managing of railway 
infrastructure and operations. Railway infrastructure refers to the fixed physical 
aspects of the railway system such as the tracks (in some cases it may also include 
stations and maintenance buildings) while operations refer to actions occurring in the 
railway system such as passenger or freight services (Cantos et al, 2001).  
 
2.2.1 Vertical Dimension 
 
According to Seabright et al. (2003) there are three degrees of vertical integration 
which are defined by the degree of division in the ownership between infrastructure 
and operations (refer to Figure 5). Vertical integration refers to an arrangement where 
a single entity is responsible for managing both the infrastructure and operations in 
the rail system. The opposite of this structure is vertical separation where ownership 
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and responsibly for managing rail infrastructure is assigned to an entity known as an 
infrastructure manger while the responsibility of operating passenger and freight 
services lies with independent railway undertakings. A government agency has often 
adopted the role of the infrastructure manager in a vertically separated railway system. 
In Britain, railway infrastructure was initially privatized following vertical separation, but 
has since been renationalized following the failure of Railtrack (Lundberg, 1996, 
Hilmola and Szekely, 2006 and Preston, 2018). 
 
The third form is partial disintegration. In this structure, ownership and responsibility 
for the management of the rail infrastructure remains with the primary operator of the 
rails (referred to as the incumbent). Other railway undertakings (referred to as 
challengers) are then granted the right to operate passenger or freight services using 
the incumbent’s infrastructure (Seabright et al. 2003). Germany is an example of a 
partially disintegrated railway system where state-owned transport company DB 
(Deutsche Bahn) acts as both the infrastructure manager and the primary rail service 
operator (Nash et al. 2013). 
 
 
Figure 5. Railway structures (Seabright et al, 2003) 
 
Vertically integrated railways were the predominant structure throughout Europe until 
the mid 1990s. There onwards most European countries began the process of 
vertically separating their railways following the lead of Sweden and Britain who 
restructured already in 1988 and 1993 respectively (Alexanderson and Hulten 2008, 
Lundberg, 1996 and Preston, 2018). Railway operations and infrastructure in Finland 
were separated in 1995 with Väylävirasto (Finnish Transport Infrastructure Agency), 
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an agency acting under the supervision of the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications becoming the infrastructure manager (Hilmola and Leino, 2006). The 
debate among researchers regarding the success of the vertical restructuring of 
railways in Europe will be discussed in later sections.  
 
2.2.2 Horizontal Dimension 
 
The horizontal integration of services that support railway operations is another crucial 
aspect that must be considered during the deregulation process. Nilsson et al (2013) 
and Seabright et al. (2003) both consider access to maintenance, depots and rolling 
stock leases as important examples of supporting services which enable fair 
competition to occur in the market. Before deregulatory reform, these supporting 
services were commonly owned by the state-owned rail operator, but have since been 
separated from the incumbent’s operations in countries such as Sweden and Britain. 
For example, rail franchises in Britain typically lease their rolling stock from dedicated 
rolling stock leasing companies instead of purchasing rolling stock themselves. 
(Nilsson et al, 2013).  
 
Literature in railway economics tends to focus on vertical separation and research on 
horizontal disintegration is widely lacking. This is perhaps surprising because a study 
conducted by Mizutani and Uranishi (2012) finds that horizontal disintegration 
generally reduced railway costs more than vertical separation. Interestingly, this 
apparent gap in research converges with a crucial aspect of my research regarding 
the introduction of competition to the Finnish railway market. This is because the non-
standard rail gauge is often considered a significant barrier to entry and thus a 
detriment to competition. As a result, horizontal disintegration potentially leading to the 
formation of a rolling stock leasing company is a relevant solution to consider. 
 
 
 2.3 What are the ways of Introducing Competition to the Market? 
 
2.3.1 Competitive Tendering and Franchising 
 
European countries have experimented with several ways of introducing competition 
to their rail markets. Seabright et al. (2003), Stead et al. (2019) and Nash et al. (2013) 
present two primary models; open access (competition on the rails) and competitive 
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tendering (competition for the rails) which, also includes the franchising model used in 
Britain. In the competitive tendering process firms bid for the exclusive right to operate 
certain routes in a country’s rail network for a specific period of time (Nash et al, 2013). 
Typically, the winner is the bidder who can convince the government that it is able to 
operate a safe and high quality service while receiving the lowest subsidy (Nash et al, 
2013). A variation of the competitive tendering model known as franchising has been 
widely used as a method of introducing competition in the British rail sector. In Britain, 
the rail network has been divided into regional franchises and companies tender for 
the right to operate them. In order to minimize set up costs, the assets of the franchise 
such as labor carry over whenever there is a change of franchise ownership (Nilsson 
et al, 2013). Competitive tending has been the preferred approach to introducing 
competition to railway markets throughout Europe (Seabright et al, 2003).   
 
2.3.2 Open Access 
 
Open access is a form of competition where the market is completely open for any 
railway undertaking to begin operations. Examples of open access passenger rail 
markets include Germany and some regions of Sweden. The primary benefit of open 
access markets is that the competition between companies is truly market driven. As 
a result of facing direct competition, Seabright et al. (2003) believe that railway 
undertakings in the open access model are under greater pressure to perform 
compared to the franchising model. The reason for this is because the threat of losing 
the franchise during the next tendering round exists only in the future. Another 
advantage of the open access model is that it allows operators to develop and operate 
route networks that are not constrained to specific geographic areas as in the 
franchising model. This has beneficial for the customer and the railway undertaking 
since optimization of service schedules to maximize connections is possible 
(Seabright et al, 2003).  
 
The challenges of the open access model include ensuring that the market is attractive 
and non-discriminatory to new railway undertakings. This is particularly relevant when 
the market features a strongly positioned state-owned operator and high barriers to 
entry. A situation like this can hinder competition from materializing due to the high 
initial investment in rolling stock that new railway undertakings have to make to enter 
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the market (Seabright et al. 2003 and Calluso, 2016). Stead et al. (2019) state that the 
quality of service provided by new railway undertakings in open access markets is 
often low. For example, open access operators often use older and slower rolling stock 
resulting in longer travel times. Stead et al. (2019) conducted a comparison between 
franchised and open access train operators in Britain and find that open access 
operators suffer from greater rates of cancellations and poor punctuality. The 
combined effect of companies offering lower quality services can result in a reduction 
of the efficiency and scarce track capacity of the rail network. 
 
Seabright et al. (2003) comment that competition on the rails has been a rare 
phenomenon in Europe with the exception of Germany where the open access model 
has led to competition. Competition on the rails between state-owned SJ and Hong 
Kong based railway undertaking MTR has also recently materialized in Sweden on 
open access routes (Vigren, 2017). Ultimately the direction of railway development in 
the Europe Union appears to be heading towards there being some form of open 
access to all national rail markets. (European Commission, 2013).  
 
2.4 Comparison of Competition Models 
 
Nash et al. (2013) conducted a comparison of the deregulation models used by 
Sweden, Britain and Germany and predict that in theory the British franchising 
approach should be the most successful. However, they find that subsidies and public 
financial support for the railway sector has decreased in Germany (open access 
market) whereas in Sweden and especially Britain subsidies have increased 
significantly. They also state that there is greater competition in Germany and Britain 
compared to Sweden, however the sizes of the markets have to be taken into 
consideration. As mentioned previously by Vigren (2017), there has been open access 
to Swedish long-distance passenger market since 2010 and thus it would be 
interesting to conduct research on if the level of public financial support for the Swedish 
rail sector has reduced similar to Germany. Nash et al. (2013) also find that the rail 
sectors in Sweden and Britain have experienced impressive growth in passenger 
numbers despite a general increase in ticket prices, while in Germany growth has been 
stagnant.  
 
Mäkinen 
 19 
Researchers consider the Swedish deregulation approach to be a success 
(Alexandersson and Hulten, 2008, Lundberg, 1996 and Nilsson et al. 2013) while the 
British approach has garnered greater scrutiny (Preston, 2018). Despite this, an 
important observation is that the literature is cautious of championing a single 
deregulation approach as being the best and rightly so. Instead, it is repeated that 
there are benefits and challenges associated with all approaches and success is 
largely dependent on how well the reform is able to match the specific characteristics 
of that particular country’s rail system (Thompson, 2003). However, some researchers 
advocate that attempts to mitigate several external factors associated with 
deregulation can explain why the outcomes observed in one country may be more 
successful than in another. For example, Lundberg (1996) considers the lack of 
superfluous political interference in the restructuring of former state-owned monopoly 
SJ as one of the reasons for why deregulation was successful in Sweden. In contrast, 
the rail privatization process in Britain was tightly intertwined with political objectives. 
Similarly, Friebel et al. (2010) and Cantos et al. (2011) argue that success is related 
to the length of the time frame in which reforms are implemented. For example, gradual 
reform in Sweden during a period of over 30 years versus shock reform in Britain 
where the privatization process was completed in 3 years. This insight regarding the 
speed of implementing reform provides another aspect to be considered in Finland 
since time is slowly running out to restructure the railway market to comply with 
European Commission legislation by 2024.  
 
 2.5 Central Debates in Rail Economics: Examining the Impact of Deregulation 
 
2.5.1 Evaluation of Britain Deregulation  
 
The success of British deregulation and the franchising approach has been a 
controversial topic of debate since the mid 1990s. Particularly in recent years many 
researchers have engaged in critical reevaluation over how the deregulation process 
was conducted and its subsequent impacts. Hilmola and Szekely’s (2006) analysis of 
British rail deregulation initially describes the process as a “great failure” citing 
numerous accidents and rising costs which resulted in an increase in public subsidies 
given to the sector. However, despite these negative impacts, they note that the 
industry has seen both growth and a drastic improvement in safety. To the same effect, 
Pollitt and Smith (2002) claim that railway deregulation in Britain has resulted in net 
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benefits using a social cost-benefit analysis, noting that the increased subsidies have 
been mitigated by traffic growth and improved operating efficiencies. More recently, 
Lyons et al. (2014) surveyed British passengers and find that the number of rail 
journeys has increased by nearly 50% since the time of reform implying that the 
objective of increasing passenger numbers has been achieved. 
 
While Pollitt and Smith (2002) and Hilmola and Szekely (2006) defend the decision to 
franchise rail services, recent studies are more skeptical of the approach. Preston 
(2018) finds that franchising has been “modestly welfare enhancing” even thought 
transaction costs continue to rise. Preston highlights concerns with the vertical 
separation of operations causing a rise in the costs of rail franchises and discusses 
proposed government plans for experimenting with reintegration. Evidence for this 
comes from numerous franchises, which have struggled to perform in recent years. 
For example, the Northern Rail franchise, the largest franchise network in Britain 
formerly operated by Arriva, is set to be renationalized following an announcement in 
January 2020.  
 
Examination of the British railway experience, reveals that aspects such as the rolling 
stock leasing company approach may be relevant to consider for Finland. In theory, 
the establishment of a company that leases existing rolling stock to new railway 
undertakings appears to be a solution lower barrier to entry. On the other hand, the 
franchising model appears to be unsuitable for Finland as passenger traffic flows are 
very Helsinki-centric. This means that establishing franchises in different parts of 
Finland would not be desirable or profitable for railway undertakings. Moreover, the 
establishment of franchises that operate exclusive networks in different parts of the 
country only benefit from competition at the tendering stage and then go on to 
essentially operate as a local monopoly. Granted, one way to prevent this would be to 
award railway undertakings with short-term contracts (around 5 years) and ensure 
competitive pressure on the company to perform in order to prevent losing the 
franchise during the subsequent tendering round. However, short-term franchise 
contracts may not entirely solve this problem in small rail markets such as Finland 
where there is limited interest to bid for franchises. Also, potential entrants to the 
market may be deterred by short-term contracts as they would prefer to bid for long-
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term contracts to ensure stability and the ability to recoup their investment over a 
longer period.   
 
2.5.2 Vertical Separation: Increased Costs Outweighed by Competition? 
 
A central debate in railway economics is whether vertical separation leads to an overall 
improvement in cost efficiency. As it stands, evidence presented by researchers 
indicates that vertical separation leads to an increase in costs. Compared to the 
vertically integrated model, transaction costs can increase due to a misalignment 
between interdependent activities (Andersson and Hulten, 2015). Andersson and 
Hulten define transaction costs as “the costs of using the market as opposed to 
organizing transactions inside of an organization”. In other words, greater costs are 
incurred by interdependent participants in the railway sector due to each participant 
incentivizing its own profit maximization during the provision of their services. 
Andersson and Hulten (2015) consider the market for rolling stock in Britain to be an 
example of this behavior. They refer to research conducted by Yvrande-Billon and 
Menard (2005) which finds that rolling stock companies lacked the incentive to provide 
specialized train sets to railway operators due to the short length of the tendering 
contracts.  
 
Approaching the debate from the perspective of the vertical integration model, 
Growitsch and Wetzel (2009) conclude that vertically integrated railways benefit from 
economies of scope and thus are more efficient. To the same effect, Laabsch and 
Sanner (2012) argue that the vertical integration model “generates cost advantages 
arising from synergies and lower transaction costs between the operation of 
infrastructure and transport”.  
 
While vertical separation increases costs, some researchers argue that the overall 
efficiency of the railway system still increases as a result of greater competition. The 
efficiency outcome of the vertical separation and integration model are shown in Figure 
6. with reference to the relationship between costs and competition.  
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Figure 6. Vertical Separation and Integration Efficiency outcomes  
(Modified from Laabsch and Sanner, 2012) 
 
Jensen and Stelling (2006) conducted a longitudinal study of data from Sweden and 
find that vertical separation increased costs, while the subsequent competition lowered 
costs. They conclude that overall cost efficiency has improved in the Sweden. Merkert 
et al. (2012) expand the analysis to include Sweden, Britain and Germany. Their 
findings are in agreement with those of Stelling and Jensen, albeit they are more 
percise. They find that full vertical separation (in Britain and Sweden) has increased 
costs by 2 to 3%, but argue that even modest competition in the railway sector is 
enough to result in a net increase in cost efficiency.  
 
Meanwhile Mizutani and Uranishi (2012) adopt a different approach and investigate 
the impact of train density in vertically separated rail system on costs. They find that 
in systems with low train densities, costs decreased because of vertical separation 
while costs increase in high train density systems. This result may have implications 
for Finland given the low train density. In a later study, Mizutani et al. (2014) affirm 
their earlier finding that train density is a crucial factor to the cost impact of vertically 
separated railway structures. They also used econometric modeling to compare the 
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costs of vertical separation, vertical integration and partial disintegration and conclude 
that in isolation, the increase in cost is practically the same regardless of structure.  
Jensen and Stelling (2006) and Merkert et al. (2012) and to a lesser extent Mizutani 
and Uranishi (2012) and Mizutani et al. (2014) all take the stance that the cost increase 
associated with vertical separation is outweighed by the competition that results in the 
market. Opposingly, Gallardo and Izquierdo (2018) argue that a rail system can also 
achieve efficiency gains without vertical separation given that there is open access to 
the passenger market such as in Germany.  
 
2.5.3 Savior of Railways: Technological Change or Deregulatory Reform? 
 
When evaluating the impact of deregulation, it is appropriate to consider what 
proportion of the gains in efficiency and improvement in service quality can be 
attributed to technological change rather than reform. For example, Lundberg (1996) 
and Lyon et al. (2016) discuss how the introduction of high-speed trains and track 
segments have drastically reduced travel times and in doing have increased the 
competitiveness of rail travel compared to substitutes. Moreover, Cowie (2018) 
investigated increases in productivity in the British rail sector during the period of 1997 
to 2015 and argues that “virtually all of the gains have come about as result of technical 
change”.  In addition, the optimization of operations in the rail system to better 
accommodate commuter and freight trains, which operate at lower speeds, has 
increased overall track capacity. This is possible due to technological developments 
regarding how crucial information such as the status and speeds of other trains 
operating on the same rail line is communicated to train drivers. For example, this 
information can be displayed directly to the driver on instrumentation panels found 
inside the cabin of the train rather than on fixed signals along the track (Transportation 
Research Board, 2006).  
 
2.5.4 Is Competition Really Fair? 
 
While there is debate over the impacts of certain aspects, the general belief held by 
most researchers is that competition enabled by deregulation has led to an overall 
increase in efficiency. In light of this, the finding presented by Calluso (2017) is rather 
surprising. Calluso studied the efficiency impacts of open access competition and 
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using a difference-in-difference estimator, found that competition on the rails has not 
led to major efficiency improvements. The primary reason for this is the failure to 
ensure non-discriminatory access in these markets. Take for example the case of 
Germany where DB is both the incumbent and the infrastructure manager, and thus 
may have an incentive to act in a manner that primarily serves its own interests. When 
fair competition is hindered, Calluso argues that costs in open access rail markets are 
higher than in a monopoly. However, a limitation of Calluso’s study is that the data and 
results are collected from a short time frame while the effects of reform are only truly 
revealed in the long-term. Nevertheless, this is an important insight because it 
highlights the crucial role that regulators have in ensuing fair competition in the railway 
sector and failing to do so can prevent a deregulated rail system from maximizing its 
efficiency.  
 
 
2.6 Conceptual Framework 
 
The examination of the literature has revealed that there appears to be consensus 
among researchers that deregulation has improved both the overall efficiency and 
competitiveness of the rail sector. However, there remains debate over how the rail 
sector should be structured to ensure these benefits are maximized. Case studies from 
European countries reveal that the choice of deregulatory reform is generally guided 
by the characteristics of the national rail system, government objectives and 
overarching European legislation.  
 
The conceptual framework synthesizes important concepts from the literature review 
with the research objectives to guide the research process (refer to Figure 7). More 
specifically, the framework will be used to identify important themes to consider during 
the data collection and analysis phases. The progression of the deregulation process 
is visualized by the dotted arrow which cuts through to the center. The elliptical regions 
represent important concepts which must be considered during the process because 
the decisions surrounding these concepts influences the outcome of competition. 
Elliptical regions have been composed so that the interrelated, but overarching 
influence is conveyed in the relationships between concepts.  
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The railway operating environment which consists of all railway related activities in a 
country has been highlighted in red. Using the railway operating environment as a 
reference point, the conceptual framework distinguishes between external and internal 
forces which impact competition outcomes.  
 
Moving outwards, the conceptual framework includes the important concept of a level 
playing field that is discussed in the literature review. In order to ensure this, legislation 
deriving from EU or national law should be imposed onto the railway operating 
environment by an impartial external organization. If this in not enforced, powerful 
organizations in the railway sector will act according to their own interests and 
competition will suffer as a result. The outermost ring represents possible barriers to 
entry to the market. For example, if there exists a barrier such as a closed rail market, 
then competition will not occur irrespective of conditions in the operating environment. 
Thus, barriers to entry are critical to evaluate when examining railway deregulation.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Conceptual Framework 
 
Moving inwards, the structure of the railway operating environment is captured by the 
horizontal and vertical dimensions. Ultimately, these factors influence the choice of 
commotion model which considers how to introduce competition to the market.  Finally, 
the competition model directly determines the type of competition that occurs between 
railway undertakings; for example, competition on the rails or competition for the rails. 
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2. METHODOLOGY 
 
5.1 Research Approach 
 
This research incorporates aspects of the future studies approach to attempt to 
describe possible future outcomes related to competition in an open access long-
distance passenger rail market. Future studies aims to study possible, probable and 
preferable futures with the intention of assisting individuals in choosing and creating 
the most desirable future (Bell, 1996). In other words, the objective is to explore how 
decisions that have been taken or will be taken may impact the future. This process is 
important because it encourages critical inspection of proposed actions and often 
highlights potential problems that may arise (Bell, 1996). Subsequently, decision-
makers can cancel or amend their plans while having an increased awareness to 
minimize any expected negative impacts. 
 
The uncertainty involved during the study and analysis of the future makes it 
challenging for researchers to provide accurate and reliable forecasts (Miller, 2006). 
However, an important aspect of future studies is that the researcher accepts and 
embraces the existence of this uncertainty and acknowledges that forecasts will 
always be incomplete. Moreover, the future studies approach is focused on providing 
simulations of possible futures rather than simply predicting the future (Mietzner and 
Reger, 2005 and Miller, 2006). This sentiment is voiced by Herman Khan who once 
said that “The most surprising future is the one which contains no surprises”.  
 
Future studies research will always have numerous limitations that researchers have 
to be aware of (Miller, 2006). Firstly, the accuracy and reliability of analysis begins to 
breakdown as we move further away from the present. Futurists are physically 
constrained to the present and cannot access the reality they are attempting to 
analyze. Hence, futurists must rely on present and past information to affirm their 
analyses of why and how various futures may occur. However, this represents another 
limitation of the future studies approach because this analysis is often strongly 
influenced by the researcher’s own personal judgment and their understanding of 
available information. A third limitation arises from how and why certain facts and 
Mäkinen 
 27 
assumptions are used to choose the most plausible outcomes from a theoretically 
infinite number of futures (Miller, 2006). 
Considering the objectives of this research, the most appropriate future studies 
approach is the scenario method. Scenarios are “stories about how the future might 
develop” (Rialland and Wold, 2009). In Figure 8. Railland and Wold (2009) outline 
four different types of scenarios researchers can use. Given that this research relies 
heavily on qualitative data, descriptive scenarios are the most suitable way to 
present the analysis. 
Scenarios are useful because they encourage the researcher to present a range of 
possible options exploring what the future could look like (Mietzner and Reger, 2005). 
The scenario method often restrains from attempts to specify the likelihoods of the 
futures under consideration (Miller, 2006). In doing so, the perceived probability of a 
given future, which is largely dependent on mere judgment, does not restrict the scope 
of analysis. Miller (2006) argues that the drawback of these probabilistic approaches 
is the tendency to solely focus on the “most likely” scenario. Consequently, there is 
less consideration given to other possible scenarios that are perceived to be” less 
likely”. 
 
Figure 8.  Types of Scenarios (Rialland and Wold, 2009) 
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Scenarios are subject to the same general limitations that were outlined above for the 
future studies approach. In addition, numerous other weaknesses of the scenario 
methodology have been argued by academics. One argument is that scenarios 
analysis is unreliable and a plethora of variables can lead to several interpretations of 
the data. As a result, scenario analysis is plagued with vagueness, imprecision and 
uncertainty (Hoffmann, 2017). Another argument detailing the weakness of scenario 
analysis is that the cognitive bias of the researcher and/or decision maker will cause 
them to immediately label certain scenarios as “optimistic” and “pessimistic” which 
may skew their assessment (Hoffmann, 2017). Thus, the combination of these claims 
can lead to the belief that scenarios are merely speculation. However, other 
academics defend the scenario methodology by providing counter arguments to these 
claims while also acknowledging the limitations of the approach such as uncertainty, 
unpredictability and vagueness. Distinguishing between forecasting and foresight is a 
counter argument to the claim that the use of the scenario methodology merely leads 
to speculation. According to Mietzner and Reger (2005), forecasting is “a prediction or 
statement of what is expected to happen in the future, especially in relation to a 
particular event or situation”. In order words, forecasting is conducted with the 
assumption that the future can be predicted given that accurate information is used. 
Conversely, foresight refers to “the ability to see what ones future needs are likely to 
be” (Mietzner and Reger, 2005) Thus, foresight that is revealed during the process of 
forecasting future outcomes represents equally valuable information. Hence, the 
implications of the scenario process go deeper than speculation or simply the 
proposed outcomes themselves. This is because the scenario methodology allows for 
the possibility to gain new insight and understanding of the impacts of decisions on 
future outcomes. To the same effect, Van der Heijden (2002) argues that using 
scenarios as a tool is advantageous due to the learning process they can provide.  
 
 There are three guiding principles for constructing effective scenarios. Firstly, the 
scenarios must be plausible meaning they “fall within the limits of what might 
conceivably happen” (Iverson, 2006). Secondly, they must be relevant, meaning they 
“highlight the challenges and dynamics of the future” (Iverson, 2006). Finally, they 
must be divergent, meaning they “differ from one another in significant ways”. (Iverson, 
2006) 
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The methodology that was followed to develop the descriptive scenarios presented in 
this research are shown in Figure 9. By intertwining this with the research and writing 
process, a cohesive structure, where each phase corresponds to a section of the 
thesis is achieved. The scenarios were derived from both the findings of the interview 
process and the analysis conducted on the long-distance passenger rail market. While 
interviewees where not directly prompted to outline individual scenarios, questions 
concerning the “development of the market” (refer to Appendix 1.) indirectly gauged 
what the managers believed concerning the outlook of what future competition in the 
market could look like.  
 
 
Figure 9. Descriptive Scenario Methodology (Railland and Wold, 2009) 
 
 
3.2 Primary Data Collection – Interview Process 
 
Primary data for this research was collected by interviewing high-level managers 
representing key organizations in the Finnish rail sector (Refer to Table 1). By 
interviewing experts, the research benefits from multiple viewpoints regarding the 
process and impact of railway deregulation in Finland while also enhancing my 
understanding of the central issues. In doing so, both the accuracy and reliability of 
the research is improved and there is less reliance on simply my own interpretation of 
available information.   
 
Experts are a valuable source of information because they offer “insider” perspectives 
and insight which would otherwise be lacking from the analysis. Often information 
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asymmetry is a limitation to the research conducted by an “outsider” and contacting 
experts is one way to counteract this. For example, experts may reveal non-
confidential information that is not publically available. Generally, the information given 
by experts can be considered of high quality because it is based on knowledge derived 
from their extensive experience and research in the field.  
 
 Interviewee Organization Interview 
Date 
Duration 
(min) 
1 Manager A Finnish Transport Infrastructure 
Agency (FTIA) (Infrastructure 
Manager) 
29/02/2020 27 
2 Manager B Rautatiealan Unioni RAU 
(Railway Union) 
05/03/2020 33 
3 Manager C Finrail Oy (Railway Traffic 
Control and Planning) 
03/03/2020 9  
4 Manager D VR (State-Owned Railway 
Undertaking) 
TBA - 
 
Table 1. Participating Managers and Interview Details 
 
Semi-structured interviews were planned and used to guide the collection of primary 
data for the research. Semi-structured interviews are interviews that consist of a 
combination of predetermined and impromptu questions. Semi-structured interviews 
are useful because they give the interviewer flexibility to ask probing questions 
pertaining to information given by the interviewee (Adams, 2015). The interviews 
conducted for this research were predominantly guided by predetermined questions 
and relevant probing questions were asked when clarity on important issues was 
required. The research objectives and conceptual framework were used as a guide in 
structuring the interview questions around five central themes (refer to appendix for 
interview questions): 
 
• Theme #1 – Competition Model 
• Theme #2 – Barriers to Entry 
• Theme #3 – Ensuring a Level Playing Field and Cooperation between                                        
S                  Stakeholders 
• Theme #4 – Impact of Competition 
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• Theme #5 – Market Development 
 
In order to ensure consistency of responses, 24 base questions were presented to all 
interviewees (refer to Appendix 1). Majority of these questions were designed to be 
open-ended and encourage detailed responses however, a few questions were 
intended to allow for direct comparison of the answers given by the interviewees. In 
addition, 1-3 unique predetermined questions were presented to interviewees. The 
participating managers each represent prominent organizations which have different 
roles and responsibilities within the Finnish rail sector. Hence, it was important to also 
use the interview as an opportunity to understand how the actions and attitudes of 
these organizations may ensure a level playing field in an open access passenger rail 
market.  
 
All interviews were conducted over the phone. The interviews were concise and lasted 
around 30 minutes each. This was sufficient time to go through all of the questions 
while being mindful of the interviewees busy schedules. The first two interviews were 
initially planned to be used as a pilot study to assess the effectiveness of the interview 
questions. Unfortunately, one of the interviewees refused to answer any of the 
questions which made assessment difficult and thus no changes to the questions were 
made. However, minor changes were made to the order of the questions after the first 
interview so that more important questions were asked towards the end of the 
interview. This decision was made after the realization that the responses became 
increasingly more in-depth as the interview progressed and the interviewee became 
more comfortable with the interview situation.  
 
All interviews were recorded. The data was organized in a table where the question 
and response of the interviewee corresponded. This arrangement allowed the 
interviewees responses to be compared and contrasted effectively. Miles et al. (2013) 
recommend that the data collection and analysis phases should occur simultaneously. 
This approach acted as a guide throughout the process. Overall the interview process 
provided the research with intriguing insight into the rail sector and most of the 
interviewees were willing to share their opinions and perspectives on the impact of 
deregulation. However, as mentioned before one interviewee refused to answer any 
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of the questions, which revealed that there is hesitation within the industry to comment 
on the impacts of change.  
 
 
3.3 Secondary Data Collection 
 
Secondary research in the form of reports, government publications, scholarly articles, 
newspapers and press releases were used to compliment the findings of the interview 
process. Publically available reports, publications and press releases offer valuable 
information and research outlining both the current situation in the Finnish rail sector 
and recent developments in the deregulation process. Often this data is published by 
governmental agencies which invokes trust regarding the accuracy and reliability of 
the information. While the Finnish government can generally be considered 
trustworthy, this information must still be critically evaluated in order to identify 
potential bias. Newspapers are also useful sources of information given they are 
critically evaluated and not overly relied on. Since newspapers react to new 
information much faster that formal research, the information they provide is often a 
good starting point for further analysis.  
 
3. FINDINGS  
 
4.1 Competition Model  
 
The conceptual framework recognizes that an important decision in the process of 
opening the passenger rail market is how competition should be introduced. The 
literature review provided a discussion on two frequently used competition models in 
Europe; competitive tendering and open access. The Finnish media has widely 
criticized the Ministry of Transport and Communication’s decision to abandon the 
planning of Berner’s Railway Deregulation Initiative in favor of open access as the 
method of introducing competition to the long-distance passenger rail market. In the 
most extreme cases headlines have even called the decision a “disservice to society” 
(Salonen, 2019). Other sources have claimed that the decision is motivated by the 
newly formed socialist government cabinet’s desire to protect the monopoly position 
of the VR, the state-owned rail undertaking (Ovaskainen, 2019). The underlying 
reason for the widespread criticism is the general belief that competition in the market 
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cannot occur without there being some degree of market restructuring to remove the 
barrier to entry. Hence the findings of this research are surprising as they indicate that 
the reaction of the media is grossly overblown and that the open access model is 
actually a more realistic solution.  
 
Firstly, the public cost of Berner’s was a significant piece of information that had been 
omitted from the announcement. Moreover, according to one manager Berner’s 
Railway Deregulation Initiative was an approach where the government was doing all 
of the work while the railway undertakings would simply come to a ready made table. 
Hence, this seemed like an extremely expensive way of introducing competition. Also, 
a consequence of the rolling stock leasing model would have been that railway 
undertakings would have effectively only competed against each other on price. 
Furthermore, a situation where labor costs would have been the only determinant of 
price due to everyone using identical rolling stock is far from an optimal situation.  
 
“We calculated that the execution of Berner’s Plan would have required a 
government investment in the region of 500 million to 1 billion euros. Given the size 
of the long-distance passenger rail market this made no sense”. – President of 
Railway Union   
 
The loss of rolling stock synergies was also a major factor in the decision to cancel 
Berner’s plan. Currently, VR’s entire operation is based on maximizing synergy 
between passenger and freight rail traffic. For example, a locomotive can be used to 
operate a passenger service to some location in the afternoon and in the evening that 
same locomotive can be used to operate freight services. Inadvertently, the decision 
to split VR would have led to a decrease in the efficiency of the whole rail system. 
Thus, one advantage of open access is that it allows VR to continue synergic transport 
operations in the rail sector.  
 
“The system in Finland is organized so that there is synergy between passenger and 
freight operations. Splitting VR would mean that these efficiency gains would be 
lost”. – President of Railway Union 
 
Mäkinen 
 34 
Another manager was slightly less critical of Berner’s Railway Deregulation Initiative 
stating that the establishment of a state-owned rolling stock leasing company would 
have accelerated the time taken for competition to occur. Conversely, in the open 
access model there is a set up delay between investing and starting operations. 
However, the manager believed there to be no difference between the choice of 
Berner’s plan and open access on the eventual outcome of competition. This insight 
suggests that Berner’s plan would have come at a huge cost to society without 
generating a greater scale of competition than open access. 
 
“The advantage of Berner’s Plan was that competition would have materialized 
quickly as new railway undertakings could immediately lease rolling stock from the 
leasing company. Conversely, competition will be slower to begin with the open 
access model. However, in the long-run I believe that the levels of competition would 
likely be similar in regardless of model”. -  Head of Railway Infrastructure, FTIA 
 
Instead the managers considered the open access model to be more appropriate 
because it encourages the formation of completion that is truly market driven and does 
not radically change the landscape of the market. A further advantage of the open 
access competition model mentioned by managers is the flexibility in the allocation of 
capacity and slots to railway undertakings that is not possible with rigid tendered 
contracts.  
 
However, an issue of open access model is that it limits interest to only those railway 
undertakings that are willing to commit to a long-term presence in the market. This is 
because the rolling stock that is purchased essentially becomes a sunk cost since it 
cannot be used in any other rail system. Thus, there is a threat that rail companies 
deem the risk associated with the investment as being too high and competition does 
not occur.  
 
4.2 Barriers to Market Entry 
 
The nonstandard rail gauge combined with the small size of the market initially 
contributed to the assumption that there is a substantial barrier to entry to the Finnish 
rail market. This research distinguishes between these two factors and finds that the 
rail gauge is not a significant deterrent to the formation of competition while, the size 
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of the market poses some issues. However, the notion of there being an 
unsurmountable barrier to entry which prevents competitors from entering the rail 
market is false. 
 
The implication of the open access model is that a railway undertaking wishing to enter 
the market must invest in new rolling stock that is compatible with the non-standard 
rail gauge found in Finland. Surprisingly, according to the managers, the barrier to 
entry to the Finnish market is, in practice, no higher than in other northern European 
countries such as Sweden or Norway which feature the standard rail gauge. This is 
because the rail network in northern Europe is relatively isolated from central Europe 
meaning that benefits deriving from the efficient circulation of rolling stock cannot be 
realized. Moreover, moving rolling stock from one market to another means that 
capacity is reduced in the original market. Hence, the experience thus far has been 
that railway undertakings tend to purchase new rolling stock for use in new markets. 
According to managers, this behavior largely negates the barrier of entry associated 
with the nonstandard rail gauge in Finland.  
 
“Of course the rail gauge has some impact, but it is not impossible to overcome. We 
have seen that new railway undertakings have invested in new dedicated rolling 
stock when entering the Swedish market in recent years”. - Head of Railway 
Infrastructure, FTIA 
 
The size of these companies is also an important aspect to consider. For example, rail 
companies such as Arriva and MTR are big customers of rolling stock manufacturers 
and can exercise their bargaining power to receive discounts. For these companies, 
the size of the investment itself is not the issue, but rather if it is worthwhile.  
 
“During the tendering process of commuter passenger services in the Helsinki 
region, MTR (A railway undertaking from Hong Kong) was even prepared to 
purchase stations for its own use. Given the financial means of these large 
international rail companies, they will have no problem investing in their own rolling 
stock if they are truly interested in entering the Finnish market”. – President of 
Railway Union 
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On the other hand, the managers felt that the size of the market largely contributes to 
the barrier to entry. Long-distance traffic flows are overwhelmingly concentrated on 
roughly five routes which connect major cities (Tampere, Turku, Lahti, Seinäjoki and 
Oulu) to Helsinki meaning there is little market-driven demand elsewhere (refer to 
Appendix 2). Consequently, managers were slightly skeptical of there being space on 
the market for a new railway undertaking as roughly four to five daily services is 
currently enough to supply the demand on these major routes. However, the long-
distance passenger market has witnessed explosive growth in the number of annual 
journeys in recent years due to the environmental trend. In response to this, one 
manger revealed that VR has reacted by placing orders for additional rolling stock to 
increase passenger capacity. Thus, increasing demand for rail services in Finland can 
organically allow space for a new railway undertaking in the market. Alternatively, 
space for a competitor could be made artificially by allocating service slots which will 
be discussed later.  
 
“Aside from the current agreement between VR and the Ministry of Transportation 
and Communications, I would say the size of the market is biggest barrier to entry. 
4-5 daily services are enough to supply the current level of daily demand for rail 
travel on major routes”. – President of Railway Union 
 
The managers were also questioned about the presence of other potential barriers to 
entry such as access to maintenance, depots and labor. Consideration of these factors 
is relevant because in the open access model each railway undertaking is responsible 
for arrangement of these services. Generally, the mangers did not consider access to 
maintenance or depots to be an issue. For example, the Rail Transport Act dictates 
that all railway undertakings have equal access to shared depots and shunting yards. 
Moreover, there are currently vacant depots located along the main railway lines in 
Hyvinkää and Turku. This means a new railway undertaking would not necessarily 
have to invest in constructing required infrastructure for its operations. Moreover, all 
maintenance and repair services are centralized in the Ilmala Rail Yard in Helsinki. VR 
Fleetcare also currently offers maintenance and repair services to freight railway 
undertakings at publically disclosed prices (VR Group, 2019b). Lastly, no laws 
regarding labor were uncovered that would make it difficult for a reputable railway 
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undertaking to recruit staff. Also train drivers can be recruited from an independent 
school in Kouvola which offers training and certification.   
 
 
4.3 Ensuring a Level Playing Field 
 
Establishing a level playing field within the railway operating environment (refer to 
Appendix 3) is a crucial aspect of the deregulation process discussed in literature 
review and conceptual framework. This research finds that in addition to a fair legal 
environment, extensive measures including separating capacity and traffic 
management into independent organizations have been taken in the sector to ensure 
all railway undertakings receive equal treatment. An unexpected finding was how the 
open freight market has helped organizations to prepare for and gain experience with 
cooperating with new entrants. 
 
The managers were confident that the Finnish railway operating environment offers a 
level playing field for current and future railway undertakings. The passing of the 
Transport Act (1302/2018) has finalized a legal environment where fair competition in 
the passenger rail market would already be possible without the current agreement 
between VR and the Ministry of Transport and Communications in place. In addition, 
functions related to traffic control and capacity planning have been separated from 
VR’s operation and have been under the responsibility of independent organization 
Finrail since 2015. As a result of these actions, VR has gradually been stripped of its 
former control over the rail system.  
 
“There has been competition on the freight side so we already have experience 
working together with VR and other railway undertakings that operate in the rail 
system. Thus, the change with regards to operations is not anything new”. - Head of 
Railway Infrastructure, FTIA 
 
According to the managers, preparations pertaining to opening the passenger rail 
market have long been underway. Fundamentally the change imposed by the decision 
to open the passenger rail market change is not as great as one might initially expect. 
This is because the organizations that form the railway operating environment in 
Finland already have over a decade’s worth of prior experience with an open freight 
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rail market. Surprisingly, from a rail economics perspective the operations of freight 
and passenger services are not too dissimilar.  
 
“No rail operator is prioritized when considering pathing. Instead the specification of 
rolling stock that is used and the importance of the social benefit that particular train 
service provides is the determinant of priority”. – Head of Railway Infrastructure, 
FTIA 
 
In order to ensure fairness and transparency in the allocation of railway capacity, the 
infrastructure manager has divided rail traffic into categories of priority. Currently, 
synergetic passenger transport is at the top of the hierarchy followed by fast passenger 
transport (Finnish Transport Infrastructure Agency, 2019a). The current system 
discourages the use of old and slow rolling stock since the specification of rolling stock 
is one of the deciding factors in determining which services get priority pathing. This 
is important because track capacity is scarce and use of inefficient rolling stock 
negatively impacts the entire rail system as discussed in the literature review.  
 
 
4.4 Impact of Competition 
 
One of the objectives of this research is to evaluate the impact of competition on 
relevant stakeholders. This theme is especially interesting given the academic debate 
concerning the overall net benefit of implementing railway deregulation throughout 
Europe that was explored in the literature review. This research finds that the impact 
of competition on the rails is perhaps not as significant as expected particularly in 
regards to further ticket price reductions. Also, the notion that competition will increase 
the market share of long-distance rail is challenged. However, general consensus was 
found among managers’ expectations that opening the long-distance passenger rail 
market will enhance welfare given appropriate service level requirements are included 
in conjunction with allocating rail capacity.   
 
Both managers regard the decision to open the long-distance passenger market to be 
positive despite the shared expectation that competition will likely not develop beyond 
a small scale. Thus, the direct benefits of competition will primarily be experienced by 
customers in major cities.  
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The intermodal competition between VR and coach company Onnibus.com can be 
used to consider the possible impacts of open access rail market competition. In many 
regards, describing the competition as “on the rails”, particularly on routes such as 
Helsinki-Tampere, would not be entirely inaccurate. Both operators would essentially 
depart at the same time and arrive within the same general vicinity in the city center. 
In addition, since highways run alongside railway lines on between major cities the 
travel times were comparable with price being the largest discrepancy between the 
two services. Interestingly, this prior competition against long-distance coach 
companies is the primary reason why ticket prices are not expected to significantly 
decrease as a consequence of competition in the rail market. This is because in 
response to the success of Onnibus.com’s low cost pricing strategy, VR has radically 
reduced the company cost structure allowing it to offer competitive prices to 
customers. One manager commented that even representatives from major 
international rail companies including Arriva, Go Ahead and MTR had been surprised 
by VR’s competitiveness during their visits to Finland.  
 
VR has already substantially lowered ticket prices in response to the competition 
with Onnibus and as a result, the margin to continue lowering them is small. Thus, 
the impact of competition on reducing the general ticket price level on routes 
throughout the country will likely be small. More likely there will be situational price 
reductions on routes with on the rails competition”. – President of Railway Union 
 
Continuing to lower the price level is challenging because certain costs relating to the 
operation of rolling stock cannot be separated from the act of providing the service. 
Large price gaps are unlikely due to operating costs of railway undertakings falling in 
a similar range. Thus the managers did not expect price to be a major factor in 
competition on the rails. Another expectation held by the managers is that competition 
will not increase the market share of the long-distance passenger market. Instead 
private car will continue to be the main competitor to rail traffic particularly in between 
major cities where highways run alongside railway lines. As discussed earlier, demand 
for sustainable transport seems to be the driver of current growth in the market. Thus 
the notion that competition will increase the market share of the long-distance 
passenger market is questioned.  
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“In my opinion competition in the rail market will not increase the market share of 
rail. Private car will remain the number one alternative to rail travel in the foreseeable 
future and growth is dependent on convincing a greater number of people to use rail 
transport. However, the problem is how to convince people to use rail, when 
highways run alongside rail lines”. – President of Railway Union 
 
Decisions regarding the allocation of railway capacity among railway undertakings 
have the potential to either maximize or diminish welfare gains from competition. In 
this instance, welfare gains refer to the overall impact that government policy may 
have on factors such as labor and social mobility which contribute to the well-being of 
people living in Finland. Hence, this is a crucial factor which must be considered when 
evaluating the impact of opening the market. As established in previous sections, 
traffic flows in the long-distance passenger market are concentrated on a handful of 
routes which means the right to operate these slots is valuable. There are several 
ways that these slots could be divided among railway undertakings and attention must 
be paid to the ultimate consequences of these actions. For example, one way to 
allocate valuable slots is to simply sell the slot to the highest bidder. However, while 
the sale of valuable slots can allow the government to raise substantial amounts of 
money, the potential negative impact on the competitiveness of the rail sector should 
be examined. This is because ultimately the railway undertaking will pass the cost of 
the slot onto its customers in the form of higher prices. Thus, expensive slots diminish 
the competitiveness of the rail sector because they unnecessarily increase costs. To 
the same effect, the infrastructure manager should also charge reasonable track 
access costs.  
 
According to one manager, attaching service requirements when awarding slots is the 
best way to allocate capacity in a welfare enhancing way. For example, a valuable 
rush hour slot (for example. Helsinki-Tampere) could be awarded to the railway 
undertaking that then agrees to continue the service from Tampere to a secondary city 
such as Pori. As a result, this arrangement would incentivize railway undertakings to 
provide services to customers in smaller cities in exchange for the right to operate on 
the most profitable routes. In this way capacity allocation can be used to maximize the 
benefits of competition through improved service levels.  
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“I believe opening the market is a good thing as long as it is done wisely. There 
needs to be a clear strategy for allocating capacity and slots in such a way that 
service levels are improved” – President of Railway Union 
 
Conversely, failing to attach service requirements on valuable slots when allocating 
capacity would be a missed opportunity as new railway undertakings could get away 
with “cherry picking” the most profitable routes to operate. This can have negative 
consequences on rural areas particularly if competition between VR and the 
challenger on the most profitable routes were to become intense.  In this situation, the 
challenger would be in an advantageous position since it is free to only operate 
profitable routes. VR, on the other hand mostly operates unprofitable passenger rail 
services around the entire country and may then cut frequencies of low traffic routes 
that are not included in its public service obligations.  
 
4.5 Market Development 
 
The final section considers the development of competition in the long-distance 
passenger rail market. It finds that VR is strongly positioned in the long-distance 
passenger market and thus it will be extremely challenging for a new railway 
undertaking to win significant market share. Furthermore, as discussed in earlier 
sections the high concentration of traffic flows on a handful of routes means that there 
is at best, limited space on the market for a new railway undertaking. However, the 
shared expectation among mangers is that a challenger will enter the market meaning 
some degree of competition on the rails is likely to occur. 
 
Managers expect competition to occur in the open access long-distance passenger 
rail market, albeit on a small scale with VR continuing as the clear market leader. 
Competition on the rails between VR and the challenger is expected to occur on routes 
between major cities where there is enough market driven demand. However, as 
discussed previously managers were doubtful of the notion that there is space in the 
market for a competitor. This suggests that the formation of competition is at least 
somewhat dependent on capacity reallocation so that there are available slots to 
operate routes between major cities. As a result, both managers predicted that in 
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addition to VR, there will be one railway undertaking operating long-distance 
passenger rail services in Finland.  
 
“My prediction is that SJ (Swedish state-owned railway company) will enter the long-
distance passenger market” – President of Railway Union  
 
Discussions with managers revealed that representatives from Arriva, Go-Ahead, 
MTR, SJ have visited Finland and indicated their interest in the market. However, it is 
perhaps unfruitful to speculate further on the intentions of these companies as this 
information will only be revealed when an official announcement is given. 
Nevertheless, managers expect that the challenger will be a large international railway 
company. Interestingly, no Finnish companies were mentioned in any discussions 
regarding potential entrants to the market.  
 
“Most likely interest to operate in the market will come from large international 
railway companies. The scale of competition is likely to be relatively small with VR 
continuing to be strong in the market. 10 years after the market is opened there will 
be one long-distance passenger rail operator in Finland in addition to VR”. – Head 
of Railway Infrastructure, FTIA 
 
4. ANALYSIS 
 
The primary objective of this research is to explore possible changes to the long-
distance passenger market following deregulation. As detailed earlier, the scenarios 
are derived through a synthesis of the views of railway experts and the subsequent 
analysis conducted in the findings section following the scenario methodology. The 
following section presents three plausible, relevant and distinct scenarios that explore 
future outcomes that could occur in an open access long-distance passenger market. 
All of the scenarios feature a sole challenger entering the market.  
 
5.1 Scenarios 
 
5.1.1 A de Jure Monopoly becomes a Natural Monopoly 
 
Before a decision of entry is made, railway companies will assess the attractiveness 
of the Finnish long-distance passenger market. This research finds the size of market 
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to be a barrier to entry because most demand for rail service is heavily concentrated 
on routes that VR can already satisfy with several daily departures. Thus, the 
attractiveness of the market is low unless space is created on the market for a 
challenger using slots and capacity reallocation.  
 
If no changes are made to the current allocation of slots, it is difficult for a railway 
company to justify investing in rolling stock to operate in the market. Consequently, no 
challenger will enter the market leaving VR to remain as the sole provider of long-
distance passenger rail service in an open market. VR then operates a natural 
monopoly in the long-distance passenger rail market because the size of the market 
creates an insurmountable barrier to which deters entry. 
 
5.1.2 Cherry Picking and Competition on the Rails  
 
The government is keen on competition occurring in the long-distance passenger rail 
market despite the size of the market posing a potential barrier to entry. Hence, it is 
reasonable to assume that changes to capacity allocation such as the introduction of 
slots will be made in order to increase the attractiveness of the long-distance 
passenger rail market. In addition, space for a challenger could be created organically 
if the strong growth in the demand for sustainable transport continues. 
 
The challenger will naturally only be interested in serving the most profitable routes. 
Given traffic flows in the long-distance passenger rail market this suggests the 
following routes would be attractive: Helsinki – Turku, Helsinki – Kouvola, Helsinki – 
Tampere – Seinäjoki – Oulu (refer to Appendix 2). Consequently, competition between 
VR and the challenger will manifest both on the rails and for the right to operate 
valuable slots (Figure 10). The inclusion of service requirements associated with the 
right to operate these slots would mean that the routings would then continue onwards 
from these major cities to secondary cities. However, this will not deter the challenger 
from “cherry picking” individual routes to operate.  
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Figure 10. Routes where competition on the rails is expected 
 
 
 
A challenger operating point to point routes loses out on the potential benefits of 
network synergies. However, it is possible that the lack of synergy can be offset by the 
challenger being able to operate rail services at lower cost. This is possible because 
the size of the challenger’s operation is small and not weighed down by unprofitable 
routes as opposed to VR’s national operation. The potential benefit of this is that the 
challenger may have a price advantage on these selected routes.   
 
 
5.1.3 When Point to Point is not Enough  
 
The final scenario entertains the notion that network synergies are desirable and 
consequently drive the challenger to form some kind of route network. The scenario 
has been divided into two versions because the outcomes, in terms of underlying 
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concept are not distinctive enough to be presented as stand alone scenarios. 
However, the two outcomes do play out completely differently.  
 
The positon of VR in the long-distance passenger market is extremely strong and there 
is simply not enough market-based demand in most parts of the country. Hence, the 
outcome that a challenger would pursue a large route network on the rails akin to VR 
is not considered plausible. 
 
 
5.1.3.a) Rail and Rubber 
 
 
Depending on circumstances, the challenger can purchase, lease or use its own fleet 
of buses and rolling stock. For example, there are several companies in Finland that 
operate compressive route networks with large fleets of buses. The challenger would 
then operate rail services on major routes for example, Helsinki - Tampere and 
compete on the rails against VR. Then, the challenger would offer services continuing 
onwards from Tampere to other cities that are operated with buses. Hence, scheduling 
would be arranged so that passengers are connected efficiently from rail services to 
bus services and vice versa. 
 
The lower operating cost of a bus means that it is possible to serve routes with lower 
traffic flows that are not profitable using rolling stock. Buses are also more flexible than 
rolling stock because they are not constrained to operate on rails. This could give the 
challenger a competitive advantage because it is able to connect passengers along 
major routes to secondary cities using its hybrid network. While most passengers 
prefer train as a means of travel, the experience of intermodal competition in Finland 
has shown that bus can quickly become a substitute for train particularly if the price is 
low. Thus, the challenger can combine service improvements such as direct routing 
and WiFi with low prices to minimize the traditional competitive disadvantages of bus 
travel. 
 
 
5.1.3.b) Connecting regional and long-distance traffic 
 
The outcome of the tendering of Helsinki region commuter traffic may have 
implications on the development of competition in the long-distance passenger rail 
Mäkinen 
 46 
market if VR does not win. As established earlier, traffic within the capital region 
accounted for 83,8% of all passenger rail traffic in 2019. Furthermore, long-distance 
traffic flows are Helsinki-centric which means there is an opportunity to connect traffic 
from the capital region onto long-distance train services. Hence, there is an incentive 
for the winner of the tendering to then begin competing against VR on long-distance 
routes between major cities. In addition, to this service benefit, the challenger would 
also have a stronger claim to receive priority pathing for the Finnish Transport 
Infrastructure Agency. This is because synergetic passenger transport is currently at 
the top of the rail service pathing hierarchy.  
 
 
5.2 Comparison to other European Cases 
 
In most European countries the former state-owned monopolist has remained strongly 
positioned in the open passenger rail market and as a result, the market share of 
challengers is small in comparison (European Commission, 2020b). European 
Commission statistics on the market share of passenger rail in Europe indicates that 
challengers in Sweden have a combined 35% market share of passenger traffic 
relative to the incumbent, which is the third highest in Europe. In other countries of 
interest with respect to Finland such as Germany and Denmark the combined 
challenger market shares are 15,7% and 12.0% respectively (European Commission, 
2020c). Britain is the notable exception in Europe with regards to the level of 
competition due to the franchising model since 87% of share market is held by 
challengers (European Commission, 2020b). Given the size and characteristics of the 
Finnish long-distance passenger rail market it is reasonable to expect the market 
share of the challenger to fall in-between the figures observed in Sweden and 
Denmark.  
 
The first scenario described an outcome where competition does not occur in the long-
distance passenger rail market and VR continues to operate as a monopoly. Perhaps 
surprisingly, the occurrence of this scenario in European passenger rail markets has 
been rare as often a challenger has entered the market (European Commission, 
2020c).  
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The second scenario has occurred in Sweden where the challenger, MTR and the 
incumbent, SJ compete on the rails on several major routes including the Stockholm-
Gothenburg route (Vigren, 2017).  In addition, Sweden has allocated capacity by 
awarding slots to railway undertakings. Market-based slot allocation has been used by 
the government in Sweden as a mechanism to divide capacity among railway 
undertakings (Borndöfter et al. 2005). Essentially, this means that slots are being 
auctioned to the highest bidder. While this can generate additional revenue for the 
government, decision-makers in Finland should be cautious to implementing this 
approach because it may inadvertently decrease the competitiveness of the rail sector. 
 
The first version of the third scenario involves the challenger developing a hybrid 
network of train and bus routes to compete against VR. Low cost transport companies 
have used similar strategies to create route networks in central Europe. For example, 
Flix operates FlixBus and FlixTrain services in Germany and is in the process of 
expanding to Sweden (Burroughs, 2020). The second version of the third scenarios 
has also occurred to a certain extent in Denmark where Arriva originally won the 
tendering for commuter services, but has since expanded the size of its operation by 
launching new routes (Railway Gazette, 2018). 
 
5. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
In conclusion, the objective of the research was to examine possible outcomes of 
competition in the long-distance passenger rail market and in doing so qualitatively 
consider the possible impacts of deregulation. Firstly, a comprehensive analysis of the 
Finnish rail market and the current deregulation process was conducted. Primary data 
was collected through interviews with managers of various organizations operating 
within the Finnish railway sector which formed the basis of the analysis while 
secondary data was used to gain an understanding of events in the deregulation 
process. The future studies approach introduced the use of the scenario methodology 
as a way to explore potential future outcomes in the market. The following analysis of 
the findings resulted in the presentation of three scenarios which outline possible 
outcomes of competition in the open access long-distance passenger rail market. 
Lastly, the domestic topic was tied to an international context through the comparison 
of the scenarios with market developments in comparable European countries.  
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The following questions were used to guide the research.  
1. What is the best way to introduce competition to the Finnish long-distance 
passenger railway market? 
2. What are the barriers to entry and does the existing rail market offer a level 
playing field for new entrants? 
3. What is the impact of various scenarios of competition? 
4. Is the proposed open access model of deregulation likely to be effective? 
5. What potential shortcomings in the actions and/or proposals of decision 
makers can the research process reveal? 
 
 
The first three questions guided the creation of the literature review and conceptual 
framework which identified five important themes associated with the deregulation 
process in Finland. The subsequent findings of the research regarding these five 
themes include: 
 
• The open access model is the appropriate for introducing competition to the 
long-distance passenger rail market.  
• The initial assumption that there is a substantial barrier to entry to the Finnish 
rail market posed by the non-standard rail gauge was incorrect. 
• Experience with the open freight rail market has given organizations valuable 
experience in ensuring a level playing field for all railway undertakings. 
• It is expected that an open long-distance passenger rail market will enhance 
welfare given appropriate service level requirements are included in 
conjunction with allocating rail capacity.   
• The shared expectation among mangers is that a challenger will enter the 
market meaning some degree of competition on the rails is likely to occur. 
 
The final two research questions address the evaluative aspect of the research. The 
subsequent findings suggest the open access competition model will be effective 
because there is less disruptions to the railway sector and existing efficiency improving 
synergies will be retained. Moreover, the effectiveness of the open access competition 
model is improved by greater flexibility in capacity allocation which allows for the 
inclusion of welfare enhancing service level requirements. However, the findings 
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caution that appropriate service level requirements should be considered when 
allocating capacity. If these are not implemented by decision makers, the findings 
indicate that potential welfare enhancing gains arising from competition in the market 
can be lost. With regards to refining the conceptual framework, the findings of the 
research support the relationships the concepts have on the formation of competition 
within the railway operating environment.  
 
Finally, the research presented following three scenarios outlining how competition 
may play out in the market: 
 
1. No challenger enters the market and VR will continue to operate as the sole 
provider of passenger rail services. 
2. The challenger and VR engage in competition on the rails on select routes 
between major cities.  
3. The challenger competes against VR using some sort of route network. 
A) The challenger operates a hybrid network of train and bus services 
B) The challenger wins the tendering of commuter services in the Helsinki 
region. 
 
The following scenarios were evaluated and compared to market developments that 
have already occurred in numerous European railway markets. The occurrence of the 
second scenario (‘Cherry-picking and competition on the rails’) is most strongly 
supported by the evidence gathered from the interviews, the findings of the research 
and precedent cases in Europe.  
 
 
6.1 Implications for International Business 
 
 
The trend of globalization is ever-present even when evaluating relatively small and 
isolated markets such as the long-distance passenger rail market in Finland. 
Deregulation and the pursuit of opening national rail markets throughout Europe is 
driven by the European Commission’s vision of a single European transport market 
where both passenger and freight railway operations transcend national markets. 
Hence, the railway operating environments in the EU will continue to become 
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increasingly interconnected and international. This trend presents considerable 
opportunities for business because once closed national markets have now become 
accessible and relevant for international railway companies.  
 
This research has implications for railway companies that are interested in entering 
the Finnish long-distance passenger rail market. Before a firm decides to enter a new 
market, it is crucial to analyze the market using the factors that were discussed in this 
research such as barriers to entry, current market conditions and trends. Using this 
information, the firm can then forecast its revenues and costs and appraise the 
investment. Moreover, the future studies and scenario methodology that was 
incorporated into this research are powerful tools that can be used by both managers 
and decision-makers to evaluate the future impacts of their strategies. Finally, the 
creation of scenarios allows for an improved understanding of possible future 
outcomes while giving managers and decision-makers a chance to identify any 
negative consequences and make appropriate changes that either minimize or 
eliminate their adverse impacts.  
 
 
6.2 Reliability of the Research 
 
 
The future studies approach acknowledges that the reliability and accuracy of analysis 
suffers due to uncertainty regarding future outcomes. Additionally, since assessment 
of the future can only be conducted using information that exists today, the reliability 
of the subsequent analysis is dependent the quality of that existing information. 
Consequently, measures that attempt to ensure this have been incorporated into the 
research methodology. For example, information from reputable peer-reviewed 
academic journals and press releases from government agencies and organizations 
within the railway operating environment have been used throughout. Given the 
reputation of these sources, it is reasonable to assume the information they contain is 
reliable.  
 
The interview data collected during the interviews held with railway managers can also 
be considered to increase the reliability of the research because these individuals have 
extensive experience and knowledge in the railway sector. However, it must be 
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remembered that the information provided by experts still often represents their own 
personal opinions and understanding. The amalgamation of countless sources 
offering different perspectives on issues increases overall confidence in the reliability 
as it becomes easier to notice inconsistencies. For example, when information 
contradicts the general narrative surrounding a topic it can then be inspected more 
closely.  
 
In order for a scenario to be reliable, it must be based on reliable information, exist 
within the realm of possibility and be constrained by justifiable assumptions. The 
scenario method improves reliability by avoiding unnecessary probabilistic labels such 
as “most likely” and “unlikely like” when describing scenarios.  As a result, the research 
is able to provide a wider range of scenarios that amass a greater part of the possibility 
space of all future outcomes. Moreover, the plausibility of the scenarios is assessed 
through a comparison with market developments in comparable EU countries. 
Ultimately, these factors mean that there is increased confidence that the true future 
outcome of competition in the Finnish long-distance passenger rail market will fall 
within the vicinity of the described scenarios presented in this research.  
 
6.3 Limitations of the Research 
 
This research followed a future studies approach to develop scenarios of possible 
outcomes of competition in the open access passenger rail market. The future studies 
approach has three common limitations which also applies to this research. Firstly, the 
accuracy and reliability of the analysis is often weakened due to uncertainty regarding 
what will actually occur in the future.  Secondly, the analysis is largely dependent on 
the researcher’s unique judgment of available information. Thirdly, in the process of 
attempting to narrow down an infinite number of future outcomes decisions to either 
incorporate or ignore certain facts and assumptions can inadvertently skew the 
analysis.  
 
In addition to the methodology, the interview and data collection process also involved 
certain limitations. For example, time was a natural limitation when interviewing high 
ranking managers. Furthermore, some academics hold the belief that all research is 
always inherently limited by the existence of researcher bias that cannot completely 
Mäkinen 
 52 
removed from the research process (Norris, 1997).  Hence, even though the opinions 
and perspectives of railway managers were included in the analysis, ultimately my own 
judgment of their significance will have inherently played a role when assigning 
importance to this information. This could have been counteracted by using the Delphi 
technique where several questionnaire rounds are conducted in such a way that 
managers respond directly to the opinions of other managers and the researcher. 
While the interviews yielded interesting and valuable insight, information asymmetry 
still exists as critical information remains confidential.  Lastly, this thesis used a 
qualitative approach and the lack of quantitative analysis is a major limitation of the 
research.  
 
 
6.4 Suggestions for Further Research 
 
Further quantitative analysis should be conducted to either strengthen or reject the 
findings of this research. Also, the findings of the research can potentially be expanded 
by using theoretical modeling to develop more sophisticated forecasts. In addition, a 
study exploring the set up costs and expected revenues of a railway undertaking 
entering the long-distance passenger would likely reveal interesting insight that is 
complimentary to this research.   
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: Interview Questions 
 
THEME #1 – COMPETITION MODEL 
 
What are the advantages and disadvantages of the open access model? 
 
Do believe competition will materialize under the open access model?  
 
What were the advantages and disadvantages of Berner’s Plan?  
 
Why did the new government cabinet cancel Berner’s Plan and decide to move 
forward with open access? 
 
What would be the most suitable way of introducing competition to the rail market?  
 
THEME #2 – BARRIERS TO ENTRY 
 
What do you consider to be the primary barriers to entry to the rail market?  
 
Is it difficult for a new entrant to acquire rolling stock and gain access to maintenance 
and depots? 
 
Is there space on the market for new entrants? 
 
What are the challenges in the process for acquiring an operating license?  
 
THEME #3 – ENSURING A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD AND COOPERATION 
BETWEEN STAKEHOLDERS 
 
In the open access model, what services can be managed/acquired by the entrant 
itself and which need to be obtained from VR? 
 
Is your organization able to make decisions that are impartial for all companies? 
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Will VR actively attempt to influence the opinions and decisions of organizations 
including Finrail, the Finnish Transport Infrastructure Agency (Väylävirasto) and the 
Ministry of Transport and Communications (LVM)? 
 
Given its position as the dominant railway operator, how can VR either promote or 
deter competition?  
 
Will VR offer its existing serivecs (e.g maintenance, depots, railway stations) to new 
entrants for reasonable prices?  
 
What is the involvement of new rail companies in future rail infrastructure 
investments? 
 
- RAIL CAPACITY ISSUES  
What are the challenges related to traffic planning and rail capacity application? Is 
the process lengthy? 
 
Other traffic limits the efficient use of rolling stock. Many track sections have high 
utilization rates and trains must wait for others to pass which means travel times may 
be slower. How can it be ensured that the rolling stock/scheduling used by new 
railway undertakings weaken the efficiency of the rail network? 
 
THEME #4 – IMPACT OF COMPETITION 
 
Do you consider the opening of the passenger rail market to be a good thing? 
 
Will competition result in lower prices for customers? 
 
Do you believe that competition will increase passenger numbers and increase the 
market sector of rail in Finland? 
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Which parties stand to not benefit from competition? For example, will competition 
raise prices in rural areas? 
 
THEME #5 –MARKET DEVELOPMENT 
 
Which routes or regions are most likely to attract competition? 
 
Is there a significant chance that competition will not materialize? 
 
Do you expect new railway undertakings to develop route networks or will they only 
operate single routes? 
 
Will the interest in operating passenger rail services in Finland come from 
international or domestic companies? 
 
What companies do you think would be interested in operating rail services in 
Finland? 
 
How many railway undertakings will operate long-distance passenger services after 
the market has been open for 10 years? 
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Appendix 2. Traffic Flows in Long-Distance Rail Market, 2019 (Finnish Transport 
Infrastructure Agency, 2019b) 
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Appendix 3. Overview of the Railway Operating Environment in Finland 
 (Finnish Transport Infrastructure Agency, 2019 pg.81) 
 
 
 
 
